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Governing the Multinational Corporation by Means of
Democratic Decision Making
Abstract
Beyond national peculiarities, corporate governance practice is mainly centered on the protection of
investors' rights. However, this view neglects the fundamental changes of the operating conditions of
business due to globalization and the weakening of regulatory frameworks. Weak or absent enforcement
of contracts, increasingly unfettered negative externalities of corporate action, and involvement of
private actors in the provision of public goods change the role of business in a fundamental way,
rendering it a political actor in part. Resulting in the extension of corporate power these developments
challenge the very assumptions of dominant corporate governance theory. Recurring misuse of this
power poses a threat to organizational legitimacy as well as to the legitimacy of the system of market
economy. Drawing on suggestions to restore organizational legitimacy by means of discursive
processes, I argue that corporate governance needs to become open to such processes to contribute to the
safeguarding of organizational legitimacy and therewith the legitimacy of the system of market
economy in a globalized world. Based on these considerations, basic requirements as well as limits for
an according modification of current corporate governance practice will be introduced.
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CLOSING THE LEGITIMACY GAP IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
GOVERNING THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION  
BY MEANS OF DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING 
 
ABSTRACT 
Beyond national peculiarities, corporate governance practice is mainly centered on the 
protection of investors’ rights. However, this view neglects the fundamental changes 
of the operating conditions of business due to globalization and the weakening of 
regulatory frameworks. Weak or absent enforcement of contracts, increasingly 
unfettered negative externalities of corporate action, and involvement of private actors 
in the provision of public goods change the role of business in a fundamental way, 
rendering it a political actor in part. Resulting in the extension of corporate power 
these developments challenge the very assumptions of dominant corporate 
governance theory. Recurring misuse of this power poses a threat to organizational 
legitimacy as well as to the legitimacy of the system of market economy. Drawing on 
suggestions to restore organizational legitimacy by means of discursive processes, I 
argue that corporate governance needs to become open to such processes to contribute 
to the safeguarding of organizational legitimacy and therewith the legitimacy of the 
system of market economy in a globalized world. Based on these considerations, 
basic requirements as well as limits for an according modification of current corporate 
governance practice will be introduced. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
    Globalization fundamentally changes the operating conditions of firms in general 
and of multinational corporations in particular. Worldwide trade and foreign direct 
investment increase, the influence of transnational corporations is growing, the 
movement of capital is accelerating, and financial markets are gaining momentum. As 
a result of these changes the capacity of national states to fulfill tasks that were 
ascribed to the state in the historical constellation of territorially constituted 
economies declined and still is declining. Despite the lingering formal monopoly of 
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coercion, the effectiveness of national politics can be doubted in cases where 
problems transcend national borders and become global (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008). 
With this decrease of national steering capacity, the freedom of action of 
multinational corporations expanded decisively (Strange, 2000). Whereas political 
action still is mostly restricted to the territory of the respective country, the latitude of 
multinational corporations is in many cases boundless (Perraton et al., 2000). The 
increasing importance and power of such enterprises on the one hand and the 
weakening of the power of states to provide for legal security and guarantee 
enforcement of contracts on the other hand result in regulation gaps (Beck, 2000; 
Giddens, 1991). In this ‘post-national constellation’ political control is increasingly 
being replaced by economic steering mechanisms – money substitutes power 
(Habermas, 2001). The more societal coordination is transferred to the price 
mechanism, the less society is capable of democratic self-control (Habermas, 2001). 
Examples for this shift of power between nation-states and corporations are the 
decrease of taxes on corporate revenues (Hertz, 2001), the incapacity to pursue 
corporate misconduct, be it by national or by international law (Weissbrodt and 
Kruger, 2003) and the power of rating agencies decisively influencing the fortune of 
whole countries and their inhabitants (Sinclair, 2005). 
Furthermore, in the course of these developments corporations increasingly engage in 
activities that were traditionally seen as the domain of national states. Ranging from 
social activities (Teubner, 2000a), the provision of infrastructure and education, the 
administration of civic rights (Matten and Crane, 2005a) to involvement in 
rulemaking on the global scale (Scherer et al., 2006), and to the generation of new law 
(Teubner, 2000b), corporations take on a political role besides their generic economic 
role. In such ways, corporations contribute to the efficient solution of societal 
problems and thus take part in the peaceful integration of society on the one hand. On 
the other hand, societal peace is threatened by these very actors. Examples are 
political lobbying benefitting corporations at the expense of individual citizens 
(Barley, 2007), the direct violation of human rights by corporations (Kobrin, 2009) 
(e.g. the use of forced labor by Unocal in Myanmar) (Kinley and Tadaki, 2004) as 
well as the complicity of corporations with undemocratic and violent regimes (e.g. in 
the era of apardheid in southern Africa) (Muchlinski, 2001), often directly flowing 
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from the devotion to the objectives of growth and profit maximization (Kinley and 
Nolan, 2008).  
These developments show that the division of labor and power between the economic 
and the political actors emerged over the last centuries gets increasingly challenged. 
With the soaring power and latitude of firms, their actions affect an increasingly 
wider range of individuals such as workers in complex global supply chains or 
persons affected by pollution, whereas the firms are not accountable to these 
individuals, and this results in declining acceptance and rising critique of corporate 
action. In cases where the impacts of a firm’s action are perceived as unjust, the 
legitimacy, i.e. the confirmation with social norms, values and expectations, of this 
specific firm (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006) as well as of the system of market economy 
as a whole (Pies et al., 2009), which is in part reproduced by corporate action, is 
threatened. Since legitimacy is a vital condition for a firm (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) such cases potentially jeopardize the survival of the firm 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Thus, the demands for firms rise to secure their survival 
not only in economic terms, but also with respect to societal acceptance and 
legitimacy. 
In the pre-globalization era of efficient national steering mechanisms, legitimacy was 
no direct problem for business. Firstly, legitimacy of economic actors as well as of the 
economic system was provided by regulatory agencies, generating a link to 
governmental legitimacy by protecting shareholders and consumers (Hillman et al., 
2000) as well as other stakeholders. Secondly, the invisible hand – postulated in 
classical economics as well as assumed in neoclassical economics – has worked 
sufficiently to maximize societal welfare through the maximization of individual (and 
thus also corporate) utility, legitimizing firms due to their contribution to the common 
good (Jensen, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2000). From this perspective economic efficiency 
and legitimacy converged. By safeguarding efficiency legitimacy got safeguarded as 
well (Hasse, 2005; Steinmann and Löhr, 1992), and therefore business could mainly 
concentrate on the maintenance of economic efficiency. Nowadays, one necessary 
condition for this convergence – a functioning regulatory framework – is not satisfied 
any more in many instances. This is either due to the cross-border operations of 
multinational enterprises resulting in the incapacitiy of nation states to control these 
operations (Scherer and Smid, 2000) or due to the operation in states with insufficient 
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or absent legal protection mechanisms, exemplified by the engagement of Unocal 
Corp. in Burma and connected violations of human rights (Richardson, 1997). 
Securing economic efficiency does not assure legitimacy in every case and regulatory 
agencies increasingly fail to protect stakeholders that are negatively affected by 
corporate action, furthering the legitimacy deficit. Therefore firms increasingly need 
to engage in the self-supply of legitimacy (Pies et al., 2009), actively seeing about its 
maintenance or reestablishment. 
Corporate governance conceived of as a mechanism that aims at guaranteeing the 
efficiency of corporations is challenged by this new situation in particular. Mainly 
referring to agency theory, in the dominant conception corporate governance is 
described as a set of mechanisms and rules designated to secure the efficient 
deployment of investments in firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1999), accommodating the 
specific role of shareholders bearing risk not completely covered by means of 
contracts (Collier and Roberts, 2001; Judge 2009). In turn, it is assumed that all other 
stakeholders ‘(…) such as employees, suppliers, bondholders, communities, and 
customers are protected by contractual law and regulation’ (Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004, p. 355). Practice of corporate governance as well as the majority of theoretical 
approaches (Judge, 2009) refer to this conception of corporate governance. The 
erosion of the traditional division of labor between private actors and the state has a 
twofold impact on corporate governance: Firstly, the assumptions of traditional 
corporate governance become increasingly challenged. Contracts are not enforceable 
in every case, externalities matter more in absence of state regulation and new 
responsibilities are being assigned to corporations in the global marketplace by an 
increasingly active civil society. Secondly, corporate action reaches further and 
affects more diverse stakeholders than in the context of congruence between national 
state and economy. In addition, states’ capacity to protect stakeholders affected by 
corporate action is limited in many cases, potentially undermining corporate 
legitimacy and thus viability, as described above. Besides the narrow, shareholder-
centered perspective, there is a broader conception of corporate governance which is 
not only concerned with safeguarding the supply of new capital, but  
 (…) with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between 
individual and communal goals. The governance framework is there to 
encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for 
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the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society’ (Cadbury, 2003).  
Following this approach, corporate governance is of central importance for rendering 
firms accountable to a wider range of stakeholders and making them capable of 
meeting the requirements of rapidly changing societal conditions and of a changed 
distribution of power between economic and political actors. 
The first aim of this paper is to show that the dominant conception of corporate 
governance does not adequately consider the changed economic and political 
conditions firms are increasingly confronted with. The second aim is to propose basic 
modifications to enable corporate governance to fulfill the function suggested in the 
broader conception. Following this introduction, the explicit as well as implicit 
assumptions of the dominant conception of corporate governance will be delineated 
and their appropriateness to the currently shifting division of power and labor 
between the economic and the political system will be explored. It will be shown, that 
these changes severely affect the rationale of dominant corporate governance and, 
furthermore, pose a threat to the legitimacy of single firms as well as for the system of 
market economy as a whole. In the third section, I will detail alternative approaches to 
corporate governance – team production theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder 
democracy – regarding their potential to address the problems resulting from 
increasing corporate power, decreasing steering capacity of nation states and the lack 
of functional equivalents on the international level. Based on these findings, in the 
fourth part requirements for the modification of corporate governance will be 
delineated.  In the fifth section, as a possible conceptual foundation for rendering 
corporate governance capable of meeting these requirements, suggestions to apply the 
approach of deliberative democracy to corporations (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) will be discussed. The concept of democratic corporate 
governance will introduced as one way to constitute the legitimacy of both 
corporations and the system of market economy as a whole under the new conditions 
of the post-national constellation. Finally, following a short conclusion will conclude 
this paper. 
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WANING JUSTIFICATIONS AND RISING CHALLENGES 
The Foundations of Current Corporate Governance Theory and Practice 
    Current corporate governance theory and practice is based on an entangled set of 
assumptions and arguments. In this section these foundational assumptions 
dominating corporate governance theory and practice will be characterized.  The 
validity of these assumptions will be analyzed in the light of the fundamental changes 
of globalization. In particular, I will examine changes in the enforceability of 
contracts, the decreasing feasibility of limiting negative externalities and the 
increasing importance of private actors in the provision of public goods. Based on this 
analysis, a shift of risk from the society and the firms towards individuals will be 
identified as a threat for the legitimacy of corporations as well as of the system of 
market economa as a whole.  
The concept of corporate governance in the form as it is prevalent nowadays can be 
traced back to a change of the relation between ownership and control of businesses, 
first described by Berle and Means (1932). By subdividing the concept of firm-
ownership into several functions, Berle and Means highlighted problems arising from 
this changing relation. Their analysis was based on the observation of an increasing 
spread of shareholding. According to their study, an increase in the number of 
shareholders of corporations diminished the capacity of individual shareholders to 
participate in the steering of corporations. Professional managers gained influence and 
the owners lost the capacity to monitor the behavior of the managers. Assuming 
utility-maximizing behavior of the managers, shareowners ran the risk of managers 
shirking or utilizing the money supplied to the company to maximize their own utility 
instead of maximizing corporate value. This situation could eventually lead to under-
supply of capital. Therefore a mechanism preventing the managers from missing 
profits of the owners of capital by bad decisions or waste them became necessary to 
secure a constant supply of new capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, from this 
perspective corporate governance can be described as a mechanism protecting the 
shareholders as owners of a firm. 
In the course of the development of the theory of the firm, the conception of 
corporations changed: initially seen as an entity, corporations were redefined as a 
nexus of contracts (Coase, 1937). Therewith the definition of shareholders as owners 
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of a fraction of corporate assets was replaced by the definition of shareholders as 
having particular contractual claims towards a corporation. Accordingly, the 
distinctiveness of shareholders got justified by the fact that shareholders hold 
unspecified claims towards the management of a firm. While stakeholders of a 
corporation, such as employees, debtors, and suppliers have well defined claims 
towards a firm, the shareholders need to rely on the management to maximize their 
return by maximizing the firm value. This argument, describing shareowners as 
residual claimants, is the basis for further justifications of corporate governance due 
to efficiency reasons. In contractarian logic, the maximization of the residual claims 
of the shareowners maximizes the overall productivity and value of the firm (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972). This in turn is seen as the optimal contribution to social welfare.  
The justification for this lies in the assumption that the output of firms is higher than 
the input. And since each unit surplus (=profit) adds to social welfare, this is 
maximized by the maximization of profits (Jensen, 2002). 
The relation of owners and managers in the constellation of publicly traded 
corporations got formalized by principle-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
highlighting the situation of asymmetric information between shareowners 
(=principals) and managers (=agents) and determining the optimal relation of cost 
necessary to prevent managers from shirking and thus to determine them to maximize 
firm value and simultaneously the value of shares. By means of this precise 
formulation, shareholder primacy got strengthened in a technical sense: since 
expression and optimization of relations more complex than the dyadic shareholder-
manager-relationship are mathematically challenging and ambiguous, alternative 
constellations got out of the focus of corporate governance theorists. 
Closely interrelated with the efficiency allegedly resulting from the maximization of 
share value is a further argument pertaining to the management of corporations. 
Accordingly, corporate governance focussing on shareholder primacy is justified in 
the following way: To render a corporation manageable, it is necessary to reduce 
environmental complexity to a degree manageable within a single-valued objective 
function – shareholder value. And furthermore, thereby managerial performance can 
be assessed by shareholders and the market for securities by means of a single value 
(Jensen, 2002). The assumption central to this justification of corporate governance is 
the view that market-based allocation is most efficient in serving the public good if 
  7
extra-economic interferences are minimized (Hayek, 2001; Friedman, 1962; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004). Accordingly, the mechanism of corporate governance 
remedies the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control in the 
most efficient manner by means of market-logics. The market for securities assesses 
corporate performance by means of the share price. Since market-based allocation is 
seen as the most efficient way to coordinate the allocation of resources, any 
interference with this principle is regarded as a potential threat to efficiency and 
societal welfare. 
Consequently, the supposed distinctiveness of shareholders in relation to a firm can be 
seen as deeply rooted in an interrelated complex of arguments. This complex is 
composed of the conception of shareholders as owners of a firm, the contractarian 
conception of the firm, which is the prevailing view today – not only in economics 
and management science, but also in law (Blair, 2005)–, the conception of 
shareholders as residual claimants formalized by principal agent theory, and the 
resulting considerations of efficiency both on corporate and on societal level. Being 
mutually enforcing in part, these assumptions and justifications are seldom doubted 
and constitute the basics of a major part of current dominant corporate governance 
practice.  
Globalization and Corporate Governance 
    Globalization has changed the operating conditions of business in a significant 
way. These changes are reflected in the business literature to some extent. In 
particular, the different consequences for corporate governance are discussed: 
blurring organizational boundaries and increasing importance of knowledge work 
(Blair, 1995; Bradley et al., 1999; Zingales, 2000), the gaining relevance of implicit 
contracts and the ongoing replacement of transactions by relations (Boatright, 2009). 
Common to these analyses is the purely economic perspective. 
However, as argued above, besides grave economic implications, globalization not 
only changes the operating conditions of corporations but also gives rise to a change 
of the role of the firm. Hence confining the analysis of the implications of these 
processes for business in general and for corporate governance in particular to purely 
economic issues necessarily overlooks further reaching consequences, which, in turn, 
might become highly relevant for the firms themselves. 
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In a part of the corporate governance literature, the extension of the scope of 
corporate action beyond purely economic issues is covered. Whereas the relation of 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is reflected (Bhimani 
and Soonawalla, 2005; Jamali et al., 2008), the assumptions underlying traditional 
corporate governance are barely questioned. Furthermore, beyond the reference to a 
potential incompatibility of the economic role of the firm and CSR, the rising 
incapacity of states to sufficiently regulate corporate action is not accounted for 
(Frynas, 2008) and the firms’ adoption of tasks originally fulfilled by the state is 
treated uncritically, ignoring the legitimacy problems potentially resulting from such a 
redistribution of tasks and power. 
In the following, the implications of the rapid shift of the division of labor between 
the economic and the political system for corporate governance will be discussed in 
detail. 
The question arising from the concentration of corporate governance on economic 
efficiency is whether the principal-agent constellation resulting from the divergence 
of firm-ownership and control is the only problem threatening the efficiency and thus 
also the legitimacy of the economic system.  
The debate about the purpose of corporations – generating value for shareowners or 
directly serving the public interest can be traced back to the second decade of the 20th 
century (Clark, 1916; for an overview see Lichner, 2009). Strongly tied to this topic is 
the debate about the function of corporate governance dating at least back to a debate 
between professors Berle and Dodd in the early 1930s (Weiner, 1964). Until today, 
this debate lives on in the conflicting views of shareholder primacy (Jensen, 2002; 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004) and the stakeholder view (Freeman, 1984) of the firm. 
Both these positions exist with different facets, stressing different aspects of the 
relations of corporations and their different stakeholders (including shareowners) and 
attaching different weight to the respective interests. However, common to the 
greatest part of these conceptions is the role ascribed to the nation-state: providing a 
proper regulatory framework. 
In the following, three major problems arising from the diminishing steering capacity 
of states and the changing division of labor between economic and political system 
will be described: the limited capacity of many states to enforce contracts and provide 
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for a functioning regulatory framework in every instance; the increasing relevance of 
negative externalities resulting from the weakening of states; the legitimacy problems 
arising from the provision of public goods by corporations. Subsequently the core 
common to these problems will be formulated in terms of a changing allocation of 
risk away from the state and the society as a whole and towards the individuals. 
Enforcement of contracts 
One of the basic assumptions of the contractarian view of the firm in general and of 
the theory of corporate governance in particular is the enforceability of contracts. As 
described above, shareholder primacy implied by the contractarian conception of the 
firm is justified by the alleged comprehensive protection of a firms stakeholders 
(except shareowners) through contracts and the legal system (Bradley et al., 1999; 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004), emphasizing the important role the “(…) legal system 
and the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic 
activity (…)” and the availability of “(…) police powers of the state (…) used to 
enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
With states becoming weaker and corporations operating out of the reach of legal 
enforcement mechanisms, be it in weak states or in undemocratic ones, the option of 
the legal enforceability of contracts becomes curtailed. Scarcely realizing this 
fundamental shift, suggestions to respond to this threat to the contractarian view still 
operate in a pre-globalization logic, postulating some ‘worldwide contracting 
infrastructure’ on the one hand and suggesting enforcement of contracts by firms 
themselves on the other hand (Bradley et al., 1999), disregarding potential corporate 
wrongdoing and severe legitimacy-problems resulting from private corporations 
taking over state-functions without democratic legitimization. 
Negative Externalities 
A further aspect of the increasingly limited capacity of states to enforce laws relates 
to externalities. While in the constellation of national economies negative externalities 
could be limited by laws, this option becomes increasingly unviable. Admitting that 
the maximization of shareholder value does not maximize social welfare when 
externalities exist, Jensen (2002, p. 246) exlicitly relies on ‘(…) the government in ist 
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rule-setting function (…)’ to create the conditions necessary to resolve externality 
problems. However, where no enforcing mechanisms exist (see above), ban or 
prevention of negative externalities by means of taxation (Pigou, 1932) as well as 
solutions proposing the internalization of externalities by the allocation of property 
rights (classical: Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1984) are only viable to a limited degree, 
since contractual obligations between stakeholders and firms cannot be enforced. 
Besides the problem of negative externalities in general, the problem of externalities 
originating from the properties of traditional corporate governance, i.e. the 
concentration on shareholder value and its ‘distasteful implications’ (Tirole, 2002), is 
in particular becoming increasingly urgent in the light of the decreasing steering 
capacity of states. 
Public Goods    
Strongly interrelated with these developments is the increasing power of business in 
general and of multinational enterprises in particular. In opposition to the widespread 
fear that the power of the state might become too strong and thus hamper the 
efficiency of markets (Hayek, 2001), nowadays a multitude of tasks assigned to the 
state in liberal models is fulfilled by business. Corporations engage in the provision of 
public goods, reaching from schooling and infrastructure and to the administration of 
rights (Matten and Crane, 2005a) and to engagement in the formulation of 
international standards (Scherer et al., 2006). This indicates that corporations exert 
significant power (Coglianese, 2007) without being legitimized and accountable in a 
democratic manner.  
The Individualization of Risk 
    In traditional corporate governance the exceptional role of shareowners is justified 
by the risk they bear through investing in corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). While all stakeholders of a firm are involved in contracts 
with this firm, only the residual claims of shareowners cannot be sufficiently 
protected by means of contracts. According to this view an agency problem occurs, 
rendering the shareowners (principals) vulnerable to the moral hazard of the managers 
acting as the agents of the shareowners. Therefore additional mechanisms, e.g. 
corporate governance, are regarded as necessary to protect these claims. Insofar, 
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corporate governance can be described as a mechanism to protect shareholders from 
risks, which cannot be made subject to explicit contracts. However, in the light of the 
shrinking power of states shareholders are not the only group being exposed to risk 
caused by a corporation.  
As described above, firstly the enforceability of contracts is not guaranteed any more 
in many instances. Therefore the existence of claims vis-à-vis a corporation resulting 
from any kind of contract must not be seen as a guarantee for the fulfillment of these 
claims. In this rising disequilibrium of power, claimants often are exposed to the 
goodwill of corporate actors.  
Secondly, different groups of stakeholders are increasingly exposed to risks resulting 
from externalities generated by corporations, bare of any legal protection.  
Thirdly, corporations increasingly engage in the provision of public goods and 
thereby assume a state-like role. According to Crane and Matten (2008), in some 
cases corporations should be treated more like states than like private actors. In this 
situation of democratic deficit individuals thus become exposed to corporate power 
and need to rely on corporate benevolence. 
Summing up, these developments can be interpreted as evidence for a shifting 
distribution of risk. In functioning democratic states, the compliance with contractual 
arrangements ideally gets secured by law, the cost of negative externalities are borne 
by the society as a whole and the provision of public goods is exercised by 
democratically controlled actors. Due to its democratic legitimization, this power 
exerted by states is regarded as legitimate by individuals. Thus the state acts as a 
mechanism minimizing and mitigating risk as well as socializing potential costs for 
the single citizen. Under conditions of insufficient regulation, many risks that were 
traditionally attended to by regulatory frameworks and therefore mitigated are 
becoming virulent for individuals. In other words: the risk gets individualized (Beck, 
1992). Traditionally states are seen as responsible for enforcement of legal claims 
towards corporations, for the protection of citizens by means of laws, for arbitration in 
conflicts between citizens and corporations and for the provision of public goods. 
Nowadays, in cases of perceived injustice and harm resulting from corporate action, 
corporations are addressed directly by affected groups or activists (Spar and La Mure, 
2003; Zadek, 2004) and thus their legitimacy gets questioned.  
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Losing Hold: Corporate Governance and Legitimacy 
With the changes described above, legitimacy of corporations, afore taken for 
granted, is becoming a central concern in need of active management. Legitimacy, as 
defined by Suchman (1995, p. 574), “is a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”.  
Following the concept of legitimacy proposed by Suchman, legitimacy can be 
regarded as socially constructed. In the process of social construction (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967) legitimacy is ascribed to an entity due to the congruence between 
the behaviors of this entity and the beliefs of the social group granting legitimacy. As 
described above, the erosion of national steering capacity and the accompanying 
increase of corporate power result in the problems of lacking enforceability of 
contracts, externalities, public goods. Being involved in these problems and often 
regarded as their causes, the capacity of corporations to gain legitimacy for the most 
part by generating value – the the mode viable in the pre-globalization era – is 
diminishing (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). While under conditions of intact regulatory 
frameworks and in relatively homogenous environments corporate legitimacy resulted 
from the economic value generated by corporations (i.e. pragmatic legitimacy) and 
the taken-for-grantedness of corporations (cognitive legitimacy), these sources of 
legitimacy are becoming less reliable. Therefore the legitimacy of corporations as 
organizations and as representatives of the predominant economic order – market 
economy – is increasingly challenged in several respects and a third type of 
legitimacy (moral legitimacy) is becoming increasingly relevant (Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006). This type of legitimacy rests on the judgment about whether the evaluated 
activity is “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 1995).  
The legitimacy of a firm can be regarded as a consequence of its productivity, 
competitiveness and viability (Monks and Minow, 1995), which are the concern of 
the interplay of shareholders, managers and directors in traditional corporate 
governance. Following the assumption that corporate governance secures market 
efficiency and therefore maximizes social wealth (O’Sullivan, 2000), it can be 
described as contributing to the legitimacy of the single firm as well as to the 
legitimacy of the system of market economy by improving the efficiency both on 
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company and market level. Insofar, besides the function to guarantee sufficient supply 
of money for a corporation on the micro-level, corporate governance contributes to 
the efficiency of the market economy and therefore to its legitimacy.  
Legitimacy on the Firm Level: the traditional view 
    Seen from an institutionalist perspective, legitimacy can be regarded as a necessary 
condition for organizational survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), positively affecting the availability of resources necessary for 
organizational survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
In a narrow view, corporate governance can be regarded as one mechanism 
legitimizing a corporation through the appointment of a corporate board (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). 
In a broader view, corporate governance can be conceived of as a mechanism of risk-
reduction or as a mechanism of guarantee, as described by Gomez and Korine (2008). 
By means of proper corporate governance, a corporation signals sound risk-control 
towards potential shareholders, thus enhancing their trust in the corporation and 
minimizing potential transaction costs resulting from the collection of information 
about eventual risks. 
In the light of the rising complexity of organizational environments due to processes 
of globalization, the management of legitimacy is becoming more and more difficult. 
Firstly, corporations are often confronted with allegations concerning violations of 
human rights and labor standards, pollution and other problematic issues (Palazzo and 
Scherer, 2006) raised by an increasingly sensitized civil society (Doh and Teegen, 
2001). Secondly, global activity in heterogeneous environments still advances the 
problem of corporate legitimacy since corporations on the one hand have to adapt to 
local conditions (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and on the other hand need to keep their 
identity as an organization. Therefore traditional corporate governance, being adapted 
to the conditions of the pre-globalization era, is becoming less effective in 
contributing to organizational legitimacy. 
Legitimacy on the Systems Level 
    Besides the necessity of organizational legitimacy for the survival of an individual 
firm, legitimacy can be defined as a necessary condition for the sustained stability of 
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the economic system of market economy as a whole. Assuming that the system of 
market economy derives its legitimacy from its efficiency in resource allocation 
(Steinmann and Löhr, 1992), inefficiency on the firm level indirectly threatens the 
legitimacy of the economic system. Corporate governance as a mechanism to secure 
firm-level efficiency thus can be regarded as indirectly contributing to the legitimacy 
of the economic system. This is in line with shareholder primacy view and a 
contractarian conception of corporate governance emphasizing the special need for 
protection of shareholders and at the same time the thorough protection of all other 
stakeholders by enforceable contracts and state regulation (Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004). 
As soon as it is conceded that the maximization of share value is not equivalent to 
maximizing the total social value created by a firm (Blair, 2003), the justification of 
the privileged relation of shareholders and corporations (e.g. Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004) becomes questionable. As emphasized by the notion of the market as a fragile 
system, the societal function of the market – contribution to the public good – can be 
disrupted by the actions of its actors (Dubbink, 2004). Furthermore, it can be argued, 
that sustained dysfunctions of the market mechanism undermine the conditions for its 
very existence. 
Since the assumptions underlying traditional corporate governance are not valid any 
more in every case, as shown above, the capacity of corporate governance to 
contribute to the securing of legitimacy both on firm and on systems level gets 
increasingly impaired. Corporate legitimacy can be regarded as constituted firstly by 
corporations themselves, inter alia by corporate governance. Corporate governance 
can be conceived of as one means to contribute to corporate legitimacy by securing 
procedural fairness. Fair procedures ‘(…) ensure a fair distribution of outcomes over 
the long term’ (Gomez and Korine, 2005, p. 741), which is a precondition for the 
legitimacy of a corporation. Secondly, corporate legitimacy gets constituted by 
corporate regulation enforced within a regulatory framework (Hillman et al. 2000). 
The former type of legitimacy, which is safeguarded by fairness of organizational 
decision processes, can be described as procedural legitimacy. The latter type of 
legitimacy, which emanates from corporate regulation, can be defined as substantive 
legitimacy (Coglianese, 2007). In cases in which states are incapable of providing a 
reliable regulatory framework, substantial legitimacy is weak. Thus, in absence of 
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substantive legitimacy provided for by a state maintaining the legitimacy of individual 
firms and of the economic system, requirements for procedural legitimacy and 
therewith for corporate governance are rising considerably. With weakening law and 
order, the legitimacy of corporate governance is in decline (Judge et al., 2008). This 
can be interpreted as a lack of adaptation of corporate governance to the changed 
conditions described above: while economic efficiency is still safeguarded, corporate 
governance does not contribute to the attainment of societal welfare any more, and 
thus legitimacy is threatened. In other words: with changing economic and political 
conditions, corporate governance is becoming dysfunctional in part. The challenge 
therefore lies in modifying corporate governance according to these changing 
conditions.  
Basically, this means that the advantages of traditional corporate governance must not 
be sacrificed while its dysfunctions need to be repaired. The question is how to direct 
economic efficiency and societal welfare back to convergence? 
IN SEARCH OF NEW PRINCIPLES 
    Contesting conceptions of the purpose and objectives of a corporation and therefore 
of the adequate focus of corporate governance are discussed at least since the second 
decade of the last century (see above). Moral arguments (Freeman et al., 2004) as well 
as the reconsideration of theoretical foundations of traditional corporate governance 
(Blair 2003; Davis et al., 1997) triggered the development of alternative approaches to 
corporate governance. Each of these alternative approaces can be interpreted as an 
attempt to remedy specific deficiencies of traditional corporate governance. With the 
aim to find corporate governance mechanisms able to cope with the challenges 
resulting from the postnational constellation, in the following, the most influential of 
these approaches will be analyzed. In particular, their reliance on the legal 
enforcement of contracts, their potential to limit negative externalities and their 
capacity to respond to legitimacy gaps resulting from corporate provision of public 
goods will be explored. 
Team Production Theory 
One attempt to modify corporate governance is team production theory (Blair, 1995; 
Blair and Stout, 1999). As described above, traditional corporate governance is 
conceptualized for overcoming the principal-agent problem which is seen as 
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essentially threatening the efficiency of a corporation defined as a nexus of contracts. 
Team production theory is based on the definition of organizations as teams (Alchian 
& Demsetz, 1972), in which team members jointly contribute input to generate 
output. However, diverging from the conclusions of this initial concept, in team 
production theory the board’s task is not the protection of a single principal (the 
shareholder) from the potentially shirking group disposing over the input (the 
managers). The core argument of team production theory is based on the increasing 
importance of implicit contracts and the resulting shift of risk towards stakeholders, 
particularly the employees. These become risk-bearers by (in part irrevocably) 
investing firm-specific skills in a team production effort – the firm – and thus 
contributing to value creation. While the risk of shareholders is limited by the amount 
of money invested, in case of layoff employees can ’reinvest’ their skills elsewhere 
only to limited extent due to firm-specificity. Therefore, the adequate focus of 
corporate governance is seen rather on the mediation of ‘…disputes among team 
members about the allocation of duties and rewards’ (Blair and Stout, 1999). Aim of 
this is the motivation of team members to actually contribute to the process of value 
creation as well as the increase of information available for decision-making on 
board-level (Osterloh & Frey, 2006).   
The credit of this approach to corporate governance lies in taking into account the 
changing risk-constellation in corporations, dethroning the shareholder as the residual 
risk-taker and the sole party in need of additional, extra-legal protection. Thus an 
exclusive reliance on contracts, prevalent in traditional corporate governance, is no 
condition for the functioning of team production theory. However, regarding the 
increasing importance of negative externalities, team production theory is constrained 
by the definition of organizations as teams and the resulting focus on team members. 
Team members join a team and invest in a project voluntarily, expecting some kind of 
reward for their investment. From this follows necessarily, that individuals and groups 
affected by corporate action without making some kind of investment and thereby 
voluntarily joining a bilateral relation can not be regarded as team members. 
According to team production theory, risk imposed on them by a corporation thus can 
not be considered within corporate governance and thus avoidance of negative 
externalities is limited to the members of the team. Moreover, and connected with the 
exclusive focus on team members, team production theory does not take into account 
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the legitimacy gaps resulting from the provision of public goods by private actors. 
Accordingly, team production theory is capable to respond to the challenges posed by 
the shifting division of labor between firms and the state only to a limited degree, 
since only the focus of stakeholder-protection is widened, not taking into account the 
necessity of increased external control. 
Stewardship Theory 
    In line with the theory of team production, stewardship theory represents a further 
theoretical critique of the principal-agent theory. Whereas team production theory is 
based mainly on a critique of the dysfunctionalities of shareholder primacy (Blair, 
2003), stewardship theory is based on a critique of the assumptions constitutive for 
shareholder primacy. The behavioral premise of agency theory is the homo 
oeconomicus depicting humans as rational utility maximizers, who act opportunisticly 
to maximize individual utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Based on psychological 
and sociological considerations, this view is shown to disregard the complexities of 
organizational life and to assume a rather simplistic view on human behavior. Instead, 
humans and therewith managers are considered intrinsically motivated, responsible 
and seen as ‘…collective self-actualizers who achieve utility through organizational 
achievement’ (Davis et al., 1997). If managers are seen as potentially detrimental for 
a firms goals and not as stewards of organizational interests – and hence as stewards 
of holders of a firm’s shares – organizational arrangements to overcome the lacking 
trustworthiness of the managers always impede corporate performance. This 
assumption can be justified by the potential counterproductivity resulting from control 
and mistrust (McGregor, 1960) as well as by the information-biasing effects of 
control as a behavioural strategy (Argyris, 1976). Governance structures aiming at 
preventing managerial misconduct resulting from an inadequate model of man, which 
assumes self-serving behaviour of managers, therefore run the risk of working like a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the evil they are destined to prevent. According to 
stuardship-theory, if instead both managers and principles (shareowners) behave in a 
steward-like way, the potential performance of a firm is maximized. 
Following from these alternative behavioral assumptions, practical implications of 
principal agent theory for corporate governance are challenged and alternative ways 
of steering corporations are recommended. Accordingly, division of the roles of board 
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members and CEO – the essence of agency-theory oriented dominant corporate 
governance and seen therein as the mechanism to prevent managerial shirking – does 
inhibit the effective management of a corporation due to insufficient latitude and 
lacking facilitation of effective action. Instead, identity of these roles is seen to 
’…provide benefits of unity of direction and of strong command and control…’ to an 
organization (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
One credit of stewardship-theory lies in the emphasis on integrity of managerial 
decision-making. Especially in ethical dilemma-situations, flexibility of decision-
making has major advantages in comparison to compliance-based action (Paine, 
1994). From the perspective of motivation and efficiency, assuming the integrity of 
managers seems to be a more prolific approach than expecting misconduct ab initio. 
However, stewardship theory is not able to compensate for the deficit of substantive 
legitimacy resulting from the potentially weakening influence of regulation on 
corporate conduct, the concomitantly increasing corporate power for two reasons. 
Firstly, the concentration on individual integrity implicitly postulated by steward 
theory harbors the danger of illegitimacy, a fortiori under conditions of expanding 
economic and also political power of managers. This is due to the fact that in absence 
of substantial legitimacy, the requirements for the procedural constitution of 
legitimacy are rising. The concentration of power in the hands of the management is a 
step in the opposite direction, since the inclusion of diverse opinions in the process of 
organizational decision-making is potentially curtailed and thus the creation of 
procedural legitimacy is impeded. Secondly, the (mostly implicit, for an exception see 
Donaldson, 1990, p. 378) reliance on regulatory frameworks renders stewardship 
theory incapable of legitimizing the operations of firms beyond stable regulatory 
frameworks. 
 
Stakeholder Democracy 
     The contested and value-laden notion of stakeholder democracy (Matten and 
Crane, 2005b) constitutes a more heterogeneous approach than the ones described 
before. It basically emphasizes the importance of democratic participation in 
corporate decision-making for two reasons. One strand of argumentation favors 
democratic involvement in the steering of corporations due to its contribution to 
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organizational efficiency. This efficiency-centered line of argument has several 
distinct facets. From a motivational point of view, participation of stakeholders in 
organizational decision-making is a means to avoid a ‘hold-up’ problem concerning 
competitive disadvantages arising from the exclusion of groups crucial for value 
creation from organizational gains. Active participation is seen to enhance the 
motivation of employees and thus corporate performance (Driver and Thompson, 
2002).  
From an informational point of view, involvement of stakeholders is seen as a means 
to enhance the capacity of a firm for decision-making adequate to the requirements of 
complex organizational environments. According to Gomez and Korine (2005; 2008), 
corporate governance developed as a mechanism to secure the consent of the 
individuals governed by corporate actions. Facing increasing complexity in the 
organizational environment, the integration of various stakeholders into corporate 
governance in a democratic way is seen as a way to increase the internal 
organizational complexity and thus rendering a corporation capable of surviving in 
this environment. This is in line with cybernetics-oriented considerations. According 
to Turnbull, open-endedness of hierarchies is flawed due to conflicts of interest 
resulting from a concentration of power, distortion of communication and a lack of 
mechanisms for self-control and self-correction (Turnbull, 1994). Furthermore, 
Gomez and Korine (2008) argue, that corporate governance capable of processing 
information about a complex environment in a superior way in turn works as a 
guarantee towards potential suppliers of capital.  
A second line of argument demands the inclusion of stakeholders for moral reasons. 
Based on the debate about the proper corporate objective (see above) and the work of 
Freeman (1984), besides the shareholders stakeholders can be seen as legitimate 
beneficiaries of corporations due to their intrinsic value (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995).  
Dominant corporate governance theory as well as – even wit a different focus – team 
production theory and stewardship theory concentrate on a single authority for 
organizational decisionmaking. Thus they provide no space for compensating the loss 
of substantial legitimacy potentially resulting from increasing power of firms and 
operations beyond functioning regulatory frameworks. In contrast, suggestions to 
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integrate stakeholders into organizational decisionmaking directly aim at changing 
decision-processes. Thus stakeholder democracy is one way to mofdify such 
processes to that effect that a loss of substantial legitimacy can compensated for by 
constituting legitimacy in a procedural way. Besides, compared to the theories of 
corporate governance analyzed before, which are centered on specific decision 
makers or beneficiaries, this theory provides the flexibility to adjust decision-
processes to the requirements of specific situations, which are manifold and dynamic. 
 
FROM CONTRACT TO IMPACT:                                                               
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Conceding that stakeholder democracy has the potential to compensate the loss of 
legitimacy of firms, two question arise: firstly it becomes necessary to determine 
which stakeholders need to be included in organizational decision-making to 
constitute or maintain the legitimacy of corporate action. Secondly, it becomes 
necessary to conceptualize the role democratic corporate governance can play with 
respect to the changed legitimatory requirements. The first question will be covered in 
this section. The argument that shareholders have contractual ties with a firm – even if 
imperfect ones – is often used to qualify this particular group of stakeholders in 
contrast to other stakeholders for special protection. This understanding of contractual 
relations is centered exclusively on explicit contracts and potential limitations of such 
contracts under specific circumstances. However, this view ignores implicit contracts. 
Implicit contracts are not formalized but nevertheless vital elements of economic 
transactions. Taking into account this type of contract besides explicit contracts 
facilitates the formulation of the relation between firms and different stakeholders in a 
systematic way. Risk not accounted for in explicit contracts thus becomes 
conspicuous (Boatright, 2009). Accordinigly, the postulation of the corporate 
obligation to report to shareholders – corporate accountability –, justified in 
traditional corporate governance theory by the residual risk borne by the shareholders 
thus appears to be not qualified. It becomes apparent that the exclusive concentration 
of corporate accountability on shareholders seemingly disregards numerous equally 
legitimate claims, already under pre-globalization conditions. Taking into account the 
diminishing steering power of states, the often insufficient enforceability of contracts 
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and the coincidentally rising economic and political power of corporations, the 
question of corporate accountability becomes even more urgent. Furthermore, the 
question is becoming more and more political in addition to its economic relevance. 
Nevertheless, despite its potential to address numerous legitimate claims towards a 
corporation, the contractarian view has its limits where relations between a 
corporation and its stakeholders are unidirectional, i.e. where no exchange 
relationship of any nature whatsoever exists. Redefining corporate responsibility by 
extending the notion of property rights to ‘both the legal aspect of property rights and 
the social conventions that govern (business) behaviors’ (Asher et al., 2005) seems to 
be a promising way to recognize the importance of a firms stakeholders (Blair, 2005). 
However, the possibility to define all stakeholder relations in terms of contracts and 
property rights, especially under conditions of cultural heterogeneity and complex 
global interdependencies, seems to be limited. 
Since corporations increasingly take on a political role, it seems adequate to regard 
them in a similar way as states (Crane and Matten, 2008). This shift of perspective 
allows to examine the problem of risks not accounted for without referring to 
regulatory frameworks. According to Keohane (2003, p. 140), there are three 
normative criteria justifying and necessitating the accountability of an actor towards 
specific groups: authorization, support, and impact. Authorization defined as the 
conferring of rights from one entity to another is seen as one normative reason for the 
duty of the authorized to be accountable to the authorizer. Political as well as financial 
support are regarded as further justifying obligation of the supported to be 
accountable vis-à-vis the supporters. The third criterion – impact – is argued to be a 
further justification for accountability. As argued by Held (2002), actors who become 
‘choice-determining’ for others and thus restricting the autonomy of these actors need 
to be held accountable. 
The issue of accountability in dominant corporate governance was exclusively 
centered on the criterion of support. Shareholders provide financial support for a 
corporation and in turn the corporation is supposed to be accountable to these 
shareholders. In the light of the increasing economic and political power of 
corporations, often exercised unidirectionally, the criterion of impact is becoming 
increasingly relevant since corporations determine choices of many people. Following 
Iris Marion Young (2004), countering increasing structural injustice resulting from 
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social and economic connectedness in a globalized economy necessitates a 
reformulation of the concept of responsibility. Whereas responsibility usually is 
conceived of as a past-oriented concept, she proposes the forward-looking concept of 
political responsibility. Mentioning the case of working conditions in third world 
countries, which exemplifies the increasing impact of corporations on individuals 
beyond the moderating power of functioning regulatory frameworks, it is postulated 
that ‘[b]ecause of the size, reach, and relative influence of such organizations, it 
makes sense to expect major decision-makers in them to take responsibility for 
working conditions.’ (Young, 2004, p. 386). This becomes even more important 
taking into account that corporations not only impact individuals beyond regulatory 
frameworks but also provide public goods without being legitimized for that in any 
manner. Consequently, the suggestion to enhance the notion of responsibility can be 
the basis to formulate the specifications of an extended concept of corporate 
accountability and of corporate governance transcending mere compliance with 
external regulation. Such an extension of accountability is regarded to ensure that the 
rights of individuals affected by corporate action are protected sufficiently (Matten 
and Crane, 2005a). Considering the central role of corporate governance for securing 
legitimacy, it becomes clear that corporate governance has to adapt to the changed 
economic and political operating conditions and responsibilities of corporations. 
In the context of the discussion about the nature and limits of the corporate 
responsibility for stakeholders Goodpaster argues that extending the fiduciary 
relationship between shareholders and management to an inclusion of stakeholders 
would represent the transformation of the modern private corporation into a public 
institution that “probably calls for a corresponding restructuring of corporate 
governance” (Goodpaster, 1991, p. 66). Firstly, the severity of such a transformation, 
blurring the traditional corporate goals, prompts him to deny the existence of 
fiduciary obligations of managers vis-à-vis stakeholders other than shareowners. 
Secondly, the adverse implications for the efficiency of organizational decision-
making – a push “towards paralysis” – are mentioned as a reason for this denial. 
However, in the light of the increasingly political nature of corporate action described 
above (Matten and Crane 2005a; Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Scherer et al. 2006), the 
first concern loses some of its relevance. In the reverse conclusion, it rather implies 
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that the governance of corporations increasingly acting beyond national regulatory 
frameworks and involved in political action requires a revision. 
Thus the second concern – considerations of efficiency within extended governance 
relations – alone cannot be seen as a decisive obstacle for the modification of 
corporate governance. In contrast, it can be understood as a guideline for the 
modification of traditional corporate governance. 
In summary, it becomes evident that traditional corporate governance as well as 
alternative conceptions in many instances fall short of taking into account the 
fundamental changes in the economic as well as in the political sphere. By either 
concentrating on the performance of corporations (stewardship theory) or limiting the 
participation in decision-making to a clearly defined target group (team production 
theory), the contingent legitimate claims vis-à-vis a corporation can not be addressed 
in a comprehensive way since these claims are assumed to be met by the regulatory 
framework and not by a corporation itself. Confrontation with this problem can be 
described as an enormous increase in complexity of decision for corporations. In 
times of sufficient state regulation economic rationality (i.e. profit-maximizing 
behaviour) was the only focus necessary for corporate decision-making. Societal 
welfare was achieved firstly by economic decision-making (via the invisible hand) 
and secondly by the regulatory framework, setting the side-conditions for the 
economic activity. However, in situations where regulatory frameworks only work 
insufficiently, corporations increasingly need to consider societal problems and thus 
have to be able to switch to social rationality (i.e. concurrent resolution of conflicts; 
see Habermas, 1984) to maintain or reconstitute their legitimacy.  
 
CONSTITUTING LEGITIMACY BY DELIBERATION: THE ROLE FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
    In the former part, we have argued that corporations can no longer rely on 
regulatory frameworks to provide legitimacy. Therefore in the following we propose 
the opening up of corporate governance structures for communicative processes with 
to secure legitimacy of corporate actions in cases where states are not able to do so. 
One way to manage legitimacy of organizations in a procedural communication-based 
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way is proposed by Palazzo and Scherer (2006). Drawing firstly on the threefold 
concept of legitimacy by Suchman (1995) described above – pragmatic, cognitive, 
and moral legitimacy – it is argued that under the conditions of globalization and the 
post-national constellation the capability of business to constitute pragmatic or 
cognitive legitimacy is decreasing. Secondly, the authors draw on the concept of 
deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1998; Dryzek, 1999). In the theory of deliberative 
democracy, deliberation is conceptualized as a network of negotiations aiming at 
controlling administrative power by finding rational and fair solutions for problems 
(Habermas, 1996). In a transfer of this theory from political science to the context of 
organizations (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007), deliberation is 
regarded as a means for corporations to compensate for the loss of pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy. Switching to a mode of 'moral reasoning' is regarded as a 
measure for the constitution of moral legitimacy by means of discursive processes 
when necessary and appropriate. The process of deliberation is seen as a way to 
achieve legitimate outcomes by the exchange of good reasons. Thereby an active 
justification vis-à-vis society replaces the mere reactive isomorphic conformance with 
societal demands or the strategic manipulation of the perceptions of stakeholders (e.g. 
by means of instrumental public relations) (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). 
According to Gomez and Korine (2008), corporate governance is the level of a firm 
where such processes need to take place to safeguard as well as signal the fairness of 
corporate action. Implicitly referring to the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ by W. Ross 
Ashby (1971) and thus arguing by means of the increased capacity of stakeholder 
democracy to collect and process information (see above), they suggest the increase 
of the complexity of corporate governance by democratization as a suitable means to 
tackle the rising complexity of organizational environments and to control major risks 
in an efficient and credible way. Therewith, the central role of corporate governance 
for managing environmental complexity and simultaneously signalling the capacity to 
do so is emphasized.  
By means of findings from strategic management theory based on systems-theory, 
which highlight the relevance of complexity for strategic decision-making (Schreyögg 
and Steinmann, 1987; Steinmann & Kustermann, 1998), the importance of dialogic 
processes for the survival of organizations in complex environments can be analyzed 
in detail. In classical organization science, organizations are conceptionalized as 
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rational constructs with the purpose of revenue-generation (Taylor, 1911), which are 
steered by a single authority. The rationality of the organization was concentrated in 
this single instance – and hence termed monological –, implicitly assuming the a 
priori correctness of plans as well as the the feasibility of these plans. However, this 
view completely ignores the limits of individual rationality (see Simon, 1948) as well 
as the complexity and dynamic of organizational environments. In contrast, in modern 
theory of strategic management, the replacement of strategic planning oriented to a 
Tailorist monological rationality by a process-oriented dialogical type of rationality 
(Steinmann and Kustermann, 1998) is advocated. Referring to Juergen Habermas’ the 
(1984), dialogical rationality can be regarded as the outcome of communicative 
processes. Such processes can be regarded as a means to contribute to the survival of 
an organization and to tackle the complexity of organizational environments in a way 
superior to the monological solution due to the increased capacity to collect and 
process information. The former type of monological rationality shows parallels to the 
theoretical foundations of traditional corporate governance. Arguing that ‘multiple 
objectives is no objective’ (Jensen, 2001), traditional conceptions of corporate 
governance postulate the necessity of shareholder-value and the resulting single-
valued objective function as a condition necessary for the manageability of 
corporations. However, referring to exactly the mentioned type of monological 
rationality described above, this position overlooks the limits of rational human 
behavior as well as the complexity and dynamic of organizational envioronments. 
 A deliberation-based conception of corporate governance by contrast can be regarded 
as analogous to the latter type of dialogical rationality. Accordingly, the requirements 
for rendering corporate governance qualified to contribute to the constitution of 
dialogical rationality can be oriented to remarks concerning strategic management in 
complex environments. 
Following that suggestion, it becomes necessary to find an appropriate mode of 
information collection and processing. At the one extreme, reform of corporate 
governance rules in favor of stakeholders (Maitland, 2001) and broad democratic 
deliberation are seen as inhibiting organizational efficiency (Thompson, 2008). While 
such reforms have the potential to ensure a maximum of legitimacy, they 
simultaneously harbour the danger of a deadlock inhibiting organizational survival in 
complex environments. At the other extreme, it is argued that inclusion of diverse 
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stakeholders enhances organizational efficiency (Deetz, 2007) and simultaneously 
increases the legitimacy of organizational action. Assuming that the effect of 
deliberation on organizational efficiency depends on the concrete design of 
communication practices (Deetz, 2007) and that legitimacy as well as efficiency 
accounts compete with respect to resources but also complement each other as to the 
viability of organizations (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Scott, 2001, p. 157), 
some compromise between efficiency and legitimacy needs to be found. In particular, 
this means that the right balancing between broad decentralized information 
acquisition and efficient information processing is necessary. 
The processes aiming at opening a corporation for deliberation needs to take place on 
the operational level of a firm. This is due to reasons of the efficacy of these 
deliberative processes themselves as well as due to the effects of such processes on 
organizational efficiency. Drawing on the parallels between the problems of 
managing legitimacy in complex environments and the systems-theory oriented 
approaches in strategic management described above, the necessity of organization-
wide sensitivity for issues relevant for organizational legitimacy becomes clear. 
Firstly, on every hierarchical level members of the organization need to be able to 
identify conflicts with the organizational environment, since early detection of 
problems allows for early reaction and enhances the flexibility to respond 
appropriately (Ansoff, 1984; Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987). Secondly, they need to 
be authorized and able to make decisions based on dialogue with persons or groups 
affected by corporate actions in a flexible way to avoid harm and thus potential 
threats for organizational legitimacy. Furthermore, the necessity for such decentrality 
follows from the potential threat to organizational efficiency resulting from potential 
overload of decision capacities and diverging interests on the top decision level. 
Though, such decentralized mechanisms alone do not guarantee for a corporation to 
constitute and maintain legitimacy in a deliberative way. The location of such 
processes on the level of corporate governance seems to be appropriate for several 
reasons. Firstly, responsibility needs to be easily localized and identified by 
shareholders as well as by the general public. Therefore, an identifiable mechanism is 
necessary to establish and signal trust in the governance of corporations, thereby 
securing organizational legitimacy. Secondly, the upper echelons in corporations 
wield the most power – in economic and increasingly also in political respect. On top 
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management level it is decided whether or not data are signalling strategic threats and 
fundamental directions in the course of strategic decision making are selected 
(Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987), also beyond purely economic considerations. 
Thirdly, there is a possibility of failure of deliberative processes on lower levels. 
Distortions in moral deliberation resulting from the hierarchical structure of firms and 
causing a diffusion of personal responsibility (Rhee, 2008) cannot be ruled out.  
Therefore some kind of guarantee equivalent to a court of last resort is necessary to 
provide the possibility of changing the direction of corporate activity. Fourthly, there 
is need for a well-defined and designated interface to the discourses of civil society to 
guarantee the receptivity of a firm for legitimate demands vis-à-vis a corporation. 
This seems to be the potential role for corporate governance in a framework aiming at 
a corporation capable of constituting dialogical rationality and therewith legitimacy. 
However, to counter negative consequences for organizational efficiency, processes 
of decision-making concerning the core activities and higher-level processes of 
deliberation constituting organizational legitimacy have to be decoupled to some 
extent (Scherer et al., 2008). This means that deliberative processes need to take place 
parallel to and independent from routine decision processes when appropriate to avoid 
mutual intereference of these two processes beyond the level necessary to safeguard 
organizational legitimacy. 
One practical suggestion pointing in this direction and concerning corporate justice 
plans and possibilities for stakeholders to contest corporate decisions is mentioned by 
Parker (2002). However, this solution stipulates access to justice as an ultimate option 
and is therefore only of limited use under conditions of a weak or absent regulatory 
framework. A further reaching suggestion concerns the modification of corporate 
governance structures towards a four-tier system. Within such a system, the interplay 
of the shareholder meeting, a social or works council, the board of directors, and a 
corporate senate is regarded as a way to include all legitimate stakeholders in 
processes of organizational decision-making (Driver and Thompson, 2002) and might 
lead in the direction of full corporate accountability beyond the boundaries of law. 
Guide for the design of such a ‘fourth power’ within corporations could be 
suggestions to connect political decision-making with societal discourses within a 
‘chamber of discourses’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite being far apart from realization, seemingly there are no less fundamental 
ways to restore the capacity of corporations in general and of corporate governance in 
particular to maintain the legitimacy of corporations and of the system of market-
economy in a way appropriate to the conditions of heterogeneous complex 
environments and the increasingly politicized role of business. In the face of 
fundamental changes in their environment and a shift in the division of labor between 
the private and the political sphere, corporations are increasingly confronted with the 
problem of diminishing legitimacy. In the pre-globalization era intact regulatory 
frameworks guaranteed the congruence of profitmaking and social welfare. Contracts 
were reliable, negative externalities were limited by law and the provision of public 
goods was a public task fulfilled by public authorities. With the diminishing of public 
steering power and the widening of regulation gaps, these assumptions are becoming 
increasingly unfounded. In many cases, the enforceability of contracts can be 
doubted. The limitation of negative externalities by state authorities is becoming 
increasingly difficult due to the global reach of corporate power, the range of many 
negative externalities transcending national borders and the weakening of national 
regulatory frameworks. The distinction between the private and the public sphere is 
blurring because of the fact that corporations often participate or independently 
engage in the provision of public goods. Summing up, these developments constitute 
an increase in corporate power and thus a higher risk for those affected by this power. 
This inter alia results in immensely increased requirements for corporations to 
maintain and restore their legitimacy. Corporate governance has the potential to 
secure organizational legitimacy and thereby also the legitimacy of the economic 
system as a whole, particularly in the light of the strengthening of global civil society. 
Whereas traditional corporate governance was able to achieve organizational and 
systems-level legitimacy by protecting the shareholders in a monological way, this 
does not apply to the current situation of increased economic and political power of 
corporations in a post-national world. To restore and maintain organizational and 
systems-level legitimacy, corporate governance needs to open up for contingent 
legitimate claims towards a corporation. The transfer of the concept of deliberative 
democracy to the corporate level in general and to corporate governance in particular 
is a promising way to re-establish legitimacy in a dialogical way. However, the way 
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towards the democratically accountable corporation is still long. On organizational 
level, ways need to be found to process and balance legitimate claims towards an 
organization and organizational efficiency. 
On the systems-level another problem might impede the enhancement of corporate 
accountability: systems-level legitimacy is not completely established by the mere 
generation of firm-specific legitimacy. The debate about the sphere of influence of 
business (Human Rights Council, 2008) is exemplary for this incongruence. Even if a 
firm behaves correctly within a sphere where illegitimate behavior could be attributed 
to the firm and therefore damage its legitimacy, the firm still might cause illegitimate 
behavior beyond this sphere, e.g. in complex supply chains, without venturing its 
individual legitimacy. Each individual firm could take an advantage from opting out 
of contributing to the legitimacy of the economic system. Therefore systems-level 
legitimacy can be regarded as a public good and a problem of collective action occurs. 
Approaches towards resolving this problem could lie in the establishment of schemes 
of effective self-regulation. Initiatives to foster corporate commitment (for a 
systematic analysis of different types of commitment see Pies et al., 2009) and 
thereby facilitate collective action – like the United-Nations Global Compact and the 
Global Reporting Initiative as well as sector-specific initiatives like the Equator 
Principles for responsible project financing – point in this direction. Nonetheless, as 
such initiatives are still far from being widespread and binding, the legitimacy of the 
economic system is in decline as rising dissatisfaction with capitalism (Globescan, 
2009) shows. 
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